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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
The Tenth Circuit has announced several decisions of note in the
area of federal practice and procedure which either expand the scope of
procedural issues, chart new courses in the field, or crystallize previously
settled doctrines. Although none of the Tenth Circuit's decisions
presents radical departures or adamant affirmations of settled doctrines,
the practicing attorney should apprise himself of the subtle changes
which have occurred during this survey period. The topics which this
survey addresses include: attorney's fees, in personam jurisdiction, pre-
trial motions, notice under the Fair Labor Standards Act, trial and post-
trial motions, the final judgment rule, and cross-appeals.
I. ATrORNEY'S FEES UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
Under the prevailing "American Rule" of attorney's fees, a success-
ful litigant may not collect attorneys' fees from the losing party.' In
United States v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef,2 the Tenth Circuit faced the
difficult task of interpreting the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).
3
This was Congress' attempt to legislate an exception to the American
Rule in situations where the United States government assumes the po-
sition of losing party.
In Boned Beef, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
seized 273 beef carcasses and offal belonging to Jarboe-Lakey Feedlots,
Inc. The USDA charged the carcasses contained diethystilbestrol (DES),
a prohibited chemical shown to leave potentially carcinogenic residue in
meat when used in feed and implants. 4 The United States later filed a
seizure action against the meat alleging violations of the Federal Meat
Inspection Act.
5
I. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975). In
the United States, a successful litigant may not ordinarily collect attorney's fees from the
loser. The rule in England, and in other parts of the world, is that attorney's fees may be
awarded to the prevailing party. Aleyska, 421 U.S. at 247 & n.18; Spencer v. NLRB, 712
F.2d 539, 543 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984). The rule has
only two narrow exceptions:
when a "loser has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive rea-
sons," he may be obliged to reimburse the winner for his attorneys' fees, and,
when an individual litigant, by successfully maintaining a suit, has conferred a
benelit on a group of persons the court may allow him to recover his attorneys'
fees from the beneficiaries. [citations omitted]
712 F.2d at 543. See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDIES 194-200
(1973).
2. 726 F.2d 1481 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 105 (1984).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982).
4. Boned Beef, 726 F.2d at 1484.
5. 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (1982). Specifically, the United States charged the meal
had been adulterated within the meaning of § 601(m). This statute provides, in pertinent
part, that meat is adulterated:
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After trial, the district judge dismissed the action finding that
although the United States demonstrated the feedlot owner implanted
the animals with DES and that DES was harmful within the meaning of
the Meat Inspection Act, the government failed to prove the amount of
DES found in the meat was harmful. 6 The court declined to consider
Jarboe-Lackey's attorney's fees request under the EAJA and both parties
appealed.7 The Tenth Circuit dismissed both appeals for finality. The
trial court, on remand, considered and denied the defendants petition
for attorney's fees under the EAJA.8
Judge Arraj, 9 writing for the Tenth Circuit, quickly disposed of an
initial jurisdictional argument'0 and proceeded to discuss the EAJA.
The court noted that Congress designed the EAJA to "relieve victims of
abusive governmental conduct and to expose more governmental action
to adversarial testing by encouraging private parties to challenge U.S.
behavior.""II The stated purpose of the EAJA is to encourage members
of the private sector to bring suit to seek review of, or defend against,
unreasonable governmental action. 12 The EAJA allows attorney's fees to
be awarded to a prevailing party in two instances. First, attorney's fees
may be collected from the United States to the extent any other party
would be liable under statute or common law. 13 Second, courts must
award attorney's fees unless they find "the position of the United States
substantially justified or special circumstances make an award unjust."14
Jarboe-Lackey appealed, citing both provisions.15
The court first considered section 2412(d)(l)(A),16 the second situ-
"(1) If it bears or contains any poisionous or deleterious substance which may
render it injurious to health...
(2)(A) if it bears or contains . . . any added poisionous or deleterious
substance which may . . . make such article unfit for human food
6. Boned Beef, 726 F.2d at 1484.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. United States District Judge for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation.
10. Jarboe-Lackey asserted that because the Meat Inspection Act limited the govern-
ment's right to detain seized meat for not more than twenty days, 21 U.S.C. § 672 (1982),
it followed that the complaint in any libel action must also be filed within twenty days, and
the government's failure to do so was a jurisdictional defect. The court rejected this argu-
ment, finding the express language of the act allowed a judicial proceeding to be instituted
"at any time against an adulterated meat food product." Boned Beef, 726 F.2d at 1485
(quoting United States v. 2623 Pounds, More or Less, of Veal & Beef, 336 F. Supp. 140,
144 (N.D. Cal. 1971)).
11. 726 F.2d at 1485 (citing Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
12. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1980), repnnted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4984.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982). This provision codifies the "bad faith" and "common
benefit" exceptions to the American Rule, making them applicable to the government.
Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984).
See supra note 1.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1982). This is an experimental provision of the act
which will be automatically repealed by its "sunset provision" if not reenacted before Oc-
tober 1, 1984. Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 204(c), 94 Stat. 2321, 2329 (1980) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2412 (1982).
15. Boned Beef, 726 F.2d at 1485.
16. 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(l)(A) (1982).
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ation described above. This simple provision, that courts shall award
attorney's fees "unless the position of the United States is substantially
justified," has thrown the circuits into bitter disagreement over its
meaning.1 7 Noting that other courts seemed in general agreement that
the meaning of "substantially justified" was essentially one of reasona-
bleness, 18 the Tenth Circuit outlined the controversy:
While there is little debate about the meaning of "substantial
justification," there is considerable disagreement about which
government position must be justified. Some courts have con-
cluded that the government position referred to in section
2412(d)(1)(A) is the litigation position. Other courts have held
that it refers to the agency action which made it necessary for a
party to file suit. 1 9
The "litigation position" means arguments presented to the court at
trial, as opposed to government action precipitating the lawsuit. 20 The
court reasoned that it did not make any difference which construction of
the clause was chosen as the litigation position of the United States will
almost always be that its underlying action was legally justified.
2 1
Without further discussion, the court adopted the interpretation of
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Spencer v. NLRB. 22 In Spen-
cer, the District of Columbia Circuit, after considering the identical issue
presented in Boned Beef, concluded that although legislative history sup-
ported both interpretations, the underlying purpose of the act would be
most effectively served by adopting the "litigation position" interpreta-
tion.23 Applying this new rule to the facts, the court in Boned Beef found
no error in the district court's holding that the posture assumed by the
government at trial had been substantially justified.
2 4
17. Compare Rawlings v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1984) ("underlying action"
interpretation); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1983);
Boudin v. Thomas, 554 F. Supp. 703, 705-06 & n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Watt, 554 F. Supp. 36, 40-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) aff'd 722 F.2d 1081 (2d
Cir. 1983); MacDonald v. Schweiker, 553 F. Supp. 536, 540-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Cornella
v. Schweiker, 553 F. Supp. 240, 242 & n.3 (D.S.D. 1982) rev'don other grounds, 728 F.2d 978
(8th Cir. 1984) (dicta); Moholland v. Schweiker, 546 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D.N.H. 1982);
Citizens Coalition for Block Grant Compliance v. City of Euclid, 537 F. Supp. 422, 426
(N.D. Ohio 1982) afd 717 F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1983); with Kay Mfg. Co. v. United States,
669 F.2d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (litigation position); Gava v. United States, 699 F.2d
1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Tyler Business Servs. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73, 75 (4th Cir.
1982); Broad Avenue Laundry & Tailoring v. United States, 693 F.2d 1387, 1390 (Fed.
Cir. 1982); Grand Boulevard Improvement Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 553 F. Supp. 1154.
1162-63 (N.D. Il. 1982); Alspach v. District Director of Internal Revenue, 527 F. Supp.
225, 228 (D. Md. 1981).
18. Boned Beef, 726 F.2d at 1486-87.
19. Id. at 1487 (citations omitted). "These two interpretations have come to be
known, respectively, as the 'underlying action' and the 'litigation position' theories."
Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984).
20. Spencer, 712 F.2d at 546.
21. Boned Beef, 726 F.2d at 1487 (Citing Foley Constr. Co. v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers, 716 F.2d 1202, 1204 (8th Cir. 1983)).
22. 712 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. 0'. 1908 (1984).
23. Id. at 556. For a differing view, see Natural Resources Ih'liNc Council v. EPA,
703 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1983).
24. Boned Beef, 726 F.2d at 1487-88.
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The court next turned to section 2142(b), a provision which would
allow recovery of attorney's fees where a party shows the government
has acted in bad faith in filing or prosecuting the case.2 5 Noting the
section is punitive in nature and would only be imposed in exceptional
cases for dominating reasons ofjustice, the court held the district judge
did not abuse his discretion in finding the provision inapplicable. 2 6 Af-
ter considering additional arguments unrelated to this discussion of the
EAJA, 2 7 the court affirmed the trial court's decision.
Spencer's interpretation of the EAJA, adopted by the court in Boned
Beef, cannot be faulted because it is a persuasive and well-reasoned opin-
ion. It should be noted though, that the court in Boned Beef might have
followed equally persuasive opinions of other courts, such as the Third
Circuit in National Resources Defense Council v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency. 28 In that case, the Third Circuit interpreted the "sub-
stantial justification" provision much differently: "Thus plainly, 'posi-
tion of the United States' means position taken by 'any agency and any
official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity.' Only
hostility to the underlying legislative purpose, we suggest, wodld permit
[such] a reading .... 29 In speaking of the competing interpretation
enunciated in cases such as Spencer, the Court stated that the interpreta-
tion adopted by these courts:
means that no matter how outrageously improper the agency
action has been, and no matter how intransigently a wrong po-
sition has been maintained prior to the litigation, and no mat-
ter how often the same agency repeats the offending conduct,
the statute [EAJA] has no application, so long as employees of
the Justice Department act reasonably when they appear before
the court.
30
In Boned Beef the Tenth Circuit adopted one of two interpretations
of the EAJA, both of which have basis in the only interpretational tool
the courts had at their disposal-legislative history. 3 1 Since the Boned
25. Id. See supra note 12.
26. 726 F.2d at 1488.
27. Jarboe-Lackey argued the District Court was required to allow an evidentiary
hearing on the issues of substantial justification and bad faith. The court held that
although an evidentiary hearing would have been permissible, the parties had ample op-
portunity to brief and argue the EAJA issue and were consequently not prejudiced by the
denial. Id. at 1489.
Next, Jarboe-Lackey contested the finding of the court that the steers had been ille-
gally implanted. The court held the finding was supported by evidence and would not be
overturned. Id. at 1489-90. Finally, Jarboe-Lackey argued that the trial court erred in
denying their motion and counterclaim for recoupment. The court held that since the
government had not sought money damages, it would be impossible to reduce or dis-
charge the claim by recoupment or setoff. Id. at 1490. As to the counterclaim, the court
held because the government had not consented to the claim, it was properly barred under
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. However, Jarboe-Lackey might validly assert a claim
against the government under the Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. § 1491 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a)(2) (1982)). Id. at 1491.
28. 703 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1983).
29. Id. at 707.
30. Id. at 706-07.
31. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
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Beef decision, attorney's fees may be recovered under the EAJA only
where it is shown that the government, as the losing party, acted in bad
faith in filing or prosecuting the action, or when the government's posi-
tion adopted at trial is not substantially justified.
II. IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
Manley v. Fong 32 required the Tenth Circuit to determine the reach
of Oklahoma's long arm statute.3 3 Specifically, the court had to deter-
mine whether a contract to purchase a fractional share of an oil and gas
lease, located in Oklahoma, conferred upon the Oklahoma court in per-
sonam jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.
3 4
The plaintiff, an Oklahoma resident, entered an agreement with the
defendant, a Vancouver resident, whereby the plaintiff was to sell a
seven/twenty-fourths interest in his oil and gas lease in exchange for the
defendant's deposit of ten percent of the purchase price in trust with a
designated attorney and the payment of the balance on a specified date.
Upon defendant's failure to pay the balance due, the plaintiff filed the
subject breach of contract action in Oklahoma. The defendant's motion
to dismiss, initially denied, was granted upon the defendant's motion to
reconsider. The trial court then entered an order dismissing the com-
plaint for lack of in personamjurisdiction. Subsequently, the Tenth Cir-
cuit reversed the order of dismissal.
3 5
Under the Oklahoma long arm statute,36 the court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a person having an interest in, using, or pos-
sessing real property within the state. Two questions then arise:
(1) whether an oil and gas lease is an interest in real property, and
(2) whether the execution of a contract to purchase an interest in real
estate vests equitable title in the purchaser.
In response to the first question, the Tenth Circuit relied upon its
earlier decision in Jones v. Tower Production Co.,37 where it held that "an
oil and gas lease is an interest in real property."138 Answering the sec-
ond question proved to be less straightforward because the court was
presented with conflicting authority.3 9 The Tenth Circuit ultimately
adopted the holding of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Alfrey v. Rich-
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4984. See generally Note, The Award of Attorney's Fees Under the Equal Access
to Justice Act, II HOFSTRA L. REV. 307 (1982).
32. 734 F.2d 1415 (10th Cir. 1984).
33. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03(a) (West 1980). The pertinent section states:
"A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an
agent, as to a cause of action or claim for relief arising from the person's: ...(5) having
an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state." Id.
34. Manley, 734 F.2d at 1417.
35. Id. at 1417-18.
36. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03(a)(5) (West 1980). See supra note 33 and ac-
companying text.
37. 120 F.2d 779 (10th Cir. 1941).
38. Id. at 782.
39. The following cases support the proposition that a contract to convey land, in the
future, and contingent upon performance of certain acts, does not create equitable title in
the vendee: Sutton v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 95 F.2d 845, 849 (10th Cir.
1984] 219
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ardson40 which elucidated the contours of the doctrine of equitable con-
version. 41 Essentially, the doctrine states that execution of a contract
for the sale of land, for valuable consideration, vests equitable title in
the vendee from the time of execution of the contract.
4 2
Finally, the Tenth Circuit addressed the considerations set forth in
the United States Supreme Court decisions of Hanson v. Denckla43 and
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.44 The pertinent section of Hanson v.
Denckla revolves around whether an individual has availed himself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state such that the
benefits and protections of its laws were invoked.4 5 International Shoe ad-
dressed the question of whether the "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice" would be offended by exercising in personam juris-
diction. 46 Relying upon these considerations, the Tenth Circuit found
that the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over an international de-
fendant who entered a contract to purchase an interest in an oil and gas
lease did indeed comport with the due process principles announced in
these Supreme Court cases. Thus, a plaintiff may obtain in personam
jurisdiction over a resident of a foreign country based upon an applica-
ble long-arm statute and presumably Rule 4(i) 4 7 which provides for ser-
vice of process in a foreign country.
III. PRETRIAL MOTIONS
A. John Doe Pleading and the Statute of Limitations
The practice of identifying an unknown or protected party in the
pleadings with a fictitious name, commonly termed "John Doe" plead-
ings, 48 raises procedural problems when a statute of limitations issue
arises. The question presented in Watson v. Unipress, Inc.49 was whether,
upon discovery of a party's true identity, insertion of the party's name in
the pleadings after the running of the statute of limitations will relate
back or whether it is technically the addition of a new party.
1938); Blakely v. McCrory, 274 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Okla. 1954); Parks v. Classen Co., 156
Okla. 43, 9 P.2d 432, 433-34 (1932).
The following cases support the proposition that this type of contract creates equita-
ble title in the vendee: Alfrey v. Richardson, 204 Okla. 473, 231 P.2d 363, 368 (1951);
Whale v. Pearson, 201 Okla. 619, 208 P.2d 552, 556 (1949); Scott-Baldwin Co. v. McAd-
ams, 43 Okla. 161, 141 P. 770, 771 (1914); Adams v. White, 40 Okla. 535, 139 P. 514, 515
(1914).
40. 204 Okla. 473, 231 P.2d 363 (1951). This is the case the trial court originally
relied upon in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss.
41. Id. at 368.
42. Id.
43. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
44. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
45. Henson, 357 U.S. at 253.
46. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
47. The court did not discuss the manner in which service of process was effected.
Rule 4(i) provides for such service and takes into consideration the procedures of the law
of the foreign country.
48. Presently, no federal statute or rule specifically authorizes this practice. Watson v.
Unipress, Inc., 733 F.2d 1386, 1388 (10th Cir. 1984).
49. Watson, 733 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1984).
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In Watson, plaintiff filed a products liability action two days before
the applicable statute of limitations expired. The complaint named
'John Doe" as one of the defendants. 50 Five months later, plaintiff
learned the identity of John Doe and sought to amend the complaint to
name the new defendant, Unipress, Inc., in the caption. 5' Unipress filed
a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, arguing the statute of
limitations barred its inclusion in the case. 5 2 Agreeing the addition of
Unipress was outside the statute of limitations, the trial court granted
the motion.
53
I On appeal, Watson asserted two arguments. First, Watson argued
that under Colorado law the place of injury determines whether John
Doe pleading tolls the statute of limitations. 54 Watson cited Colorado
Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) 55 as authority for the proposition that
John Doe pleading allows substitution of the real party, after the statute
has run, if the original claim is timely filed.5 6 The Tenth Circuit rejected
this argument. The court stated neither the rule itself nor the recent
Colorado case of Marriot v. Goldstein57 could be read as allowing substitu-
tion of Unipress. 58 The court decided it did not need to determine
whether Colorado or federal law controlled on the tolling issue since
plaintiff's cause of action against defendant would fail in either
situation.
59
Second, Watson contended that her amended complaint naming
Unipress as defendant, filed after the statute had run, should relate back
to the date of original filing under Federal Rule 15(c). 60 In considering
this argument, the court stressed the difference between addition of a
50. Id. at 1387. The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure allow John Doe pleading. See
CoLo. R. Civ. P. 10(a).
51. Watson, 733 F.2d at 1387. At the time of injury the company was named Unipress,
Inc. As the result of a merger, the company's name became BMM Weston, Inc. Through-




55. COLO. R. Civ. P. 10(a). The rule states in pertinent part: "In the complaint the
title of the action shall include the names of all parties."
56. Vatson, 733 F.2d at 1388.
57. 662 P.2d 496 (Colo. App. 1983). The court in Marriot held that a party replacing a
"John Doe" caption with the true party amounted to "changing a party" within the mean-
ing of Colorado Rule 15(c). The court stated that the amendment would only relate back
when the record shows that the requirements of the rule have been met. 662 P.2d at 498.
Rule 15(c) states in pertinent part:
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back
if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for
commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment
1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be
prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and 2) knew or should have
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the
action would have been brought against him.
COLO. R. Civ. P. 15(c). The Watson court stated that in Marriot, the Colorado Court of
Appeals impliedly held that John Doe pleading did not operate to toll the statute of limita-
tions. Watson, 733 F.2d at 1388.
58. Watson, 733 F.2d at 1388.
59. Id. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
1984]
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new party and a mere misnomer. 6 ' The court restated its holding in
Archuleta v. Duffy's, Inc. ,62 that in order for an amendment which substi-
tutes a new party to relate back, the requirements of rule 15(c) must be
met:6 3 (1) the suit involves the very same transaction or occurrence;
(2) the new party had prior notice of action before expiration of the
statute of limitations; and (3) the added party knew, or should have
known, that but for a mistake in identity he would have been included in
the original complaint. 64
Applying these requirements to the facts, the court found Unipress,
Inc. had no knowledge, nor should it have known, of the controversy
until several months after the statute ran. 6 5 The court affirmed the or-
der of the district court dismissing Unipress from the action.
66
In Watson, The Tenth Circuit strictly adhered to the relation back
provisions of Rule 15 and refused to accept the softer approach taken by
some other courts. 6 7 This interpretation, however, is the majority posi-
tion on the issue of John Doe Pleading.
68
B. Conversion of Motion to Dismiss into Motion for Summary Judgment
If a party moving to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 1269 also presents new evidence which is
not excluded by the judge, the motion must be treated as a motion for
summary judgement under Rule 56.70 Ordinarily, when a motion to
dismiss is treated as a motion for summary judgment, the hearing and
notice requirements of Rule 56 must be strictly followed. 7 1 The Tenth
Circuit, however, has long held that a party may waive the hearing and
61. Watson, 733 F.2d at 1389.
62. 471 F.2d 33 (10th Cir. 1973).
63. 733 F.2d at 1389.
64. Id. at 1390.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Cf Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
940 (1979). In Ingram, the defendant, as in Watson, had no notice of the action prior to the
expiration of the statute of limitations. The court nevertheless held the amendment re-
lated back pursuant to Rule 15.
68. See, e.g., Royal Indem. Co. v. Petrozzino, 598 F.2d 816, 820 (3d Cir. 1979); Varlack
v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1977); Simmons v. Fenton, 480 F.2d
133, 136 (7th Cir. 1973). See generally 3J. MOORE &J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
115.15 [4.-2] (2d ed. 1984).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 12. Subsection (c) of the rule states in pertinent part:
If on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
Summary Judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall
be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such
motion by Rule 56.
70. Adams v. Campbell County School District, 483 F.2d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir. 1973).
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides in pertinent part:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56
71. Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 480 F.2d 607 (10th Cir.
1973). Rule 56(c) provides, in relevant part, that the motion "shall be served at least 10
(Vol. 62:1
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notice requirements. 72  In Prospero Associates v. Burroughs Corp.,7 3 the
Tenth Circuit decided for the first time that a party waived the notice
requirements of Rule 56 as a result of certain pretrial conduct.
7 4
In Prospero, plaintiffs filed a successful breach of contract action in
state court. 7 5 Thereafter, plaintiff Prospero Associates (Prospero), filed
another state court action seeking additional damages. 76 After defend-
ant Burroughs Corporation (Burroughs) removed the action to federal
district court, it filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of resjudicata,
and alternatively moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 77 In its
motion, Burroughs included evidence of the state court action.7 8 The
district court treated the motion to dismiss as one for summary judg-
ment and dismissed the complaint on resjudicata grounds.
79
On appeal, Prospero argued the district court had converted the
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment without the req-
uisite notice. 80 The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, holding Pros-
pero waived the notice requirements. 8 1 The Tenth Circuit principally
relied on Prospero's pretrial pleadings as the basis for its conclusion.
8 2
In its opposition brief to Burroughs' motion to dismiss, Prospero
argued that Burroughs failed to affirmatively plead resjudicata, and if this
argument were to "be considered at all, the motion would have to be
treated as one for summary judgment."'8 3 Burroughs responded that it
agreed-its motion should be considered as one for summary judgment,
and moved the court accordingly. 84 The trial court thereafter granted
Burroughs' motion for summary judgment.8 5 Based on these events,
the court held Prospero waived its right to formal notice.
8 6
This holding prompted Judge McKay to file a strong dissent.
Although in agreement that there are occasions where a party might
waive the requirements of Rule 56, Judge McKay argued that this was
not one of them.8 7 The dissent recounted the pretrial activities between
the parties. Initially Prospero asserted that the motion to dismiss was
days before the time fixed for the hearing." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See also Annot., 1 A.L.R.
FED. 295 (1969 & Supp. 1984).
72. Id. at 608.
73. 714 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1983).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1023.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1023-24.
78. Id. Burroughs incorporated by reference the findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and judgment in the state court case.
79. Id. at 1024.
80. Id. Prospero also contested the trial court's summary judgment ruling on the
merits. This aspect of the court's opinion will not be reviewed.
81. Id. at 1024-25. Under proper circumstances the notice requirements of Rule 56
may be waived. Mustang, 480 F.2d at 608.
82. 714 F.2d at 1024-25.
83. Id. at 1024.
84. Id. at 1024-25.
85. Id. at 1025.
86. Id. The court also addressed and decided the resjudicata issue. This aspect of the
opinion is not discussed. See id. at 1025-28.
87. Id. at 1028 (McKay, J., dissenting).
1984]
DENVER UNIVERSITY L W REVIEW
hypothetically improper and it might be a motion for summary judg-
ment. Burroughs mischaracterized Prospero's statement regarding
summary judgment and the summary judgment ruling was entered.
88
Judge McKay could not understand why the court sanctioned violations
of Rule 56 when its requirements were so easily satisfied. 89
In past Tenth Circuit cases on this issue,90 the court has maintained
that Rule 56 notice and hearing requirements may be waived by a party.
The court has never before indicated what might constitute waiver, but
has only conclusorily stated what does not constitute waiver without any
discussion of particular facts. 9 1 In Prospero, the Tenth Circuit has for the
first time held thaf a party's actions amount to waiver, but again, the
court has failed to articulate the criteria on which it relied. The court
seems intent on deciding such waiver of notice issues on a case-by-case
basis. Because a party might never know if its action constitutes waiver,
it would seem to be in the interest of justice to simply follow Judge Mc-
Kay's suggestion and demand compliance with Rule 56 notice
requirements.
IV. NOTICE PROVISION UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 193892 (FLSA) provides employ-
ees with a means of redress against employers to recover unpaid wages
and penalizes employers found to be in violation of provisions of the
FLSA.93 Specifically, section 216(b) of the FLSA states that a legal ac-
tion may be maintained by an employee on his own behalf and collec-
tively on behalf of other employees similarly situated. 94 The procedural
mechanism of a section 216(b) action creates confusion for the parties,
attorneys, and the courts. The Tenth Circuit, in Dolan v. Project Construc-
tion Corp.,95 attempted to reduce this confusion by announcing the pro-
cedural mechanism which would govern section 216(b) actions.
Dolan involved an employee's suit to recover wages and overtime
pay pursuant to sections six and seven of the FLSA.9 6 In the district
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Dolese v. United States, 541 F.2d 853, 855 (10th Cir. 1976); Adams v. Campbell
County School District, 483 F.2d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir. 1973); Mustang Fuel Corp. v.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 480 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1973).
91. See Dolese v. United States, 541 F.2d 853, 855 (rejecting an argument of waiver,
noting that objecting party's continuing protests hardly amounted to waiver); Mustang
Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 480 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that
the facts presented, which the court did not discuss, did not constitute waiver).
92. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-262 (1982).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1982).
94. Section 216(b) provides, inter alia: "An action to recover the liability prescribed in
[this act] . . .may be maintained . . . by any one or more employees for and in behalf of
himself or themselves and others employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a
party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a
party and such consent is filed in the court in which the action is brought." 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (1982).
95. 725 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1984).
96. Dolan, 725 F.2d at 1265.
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court, 97 the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to give notice to other
similarly situated employees. This motion was referred to a magistrate,
denied by the magistrate, and then subsequently affirmed by the district
court. Thereupon the plaintiffs brought this interlocutory appeal to the
Tenth Circuit to review the district court order. Essentially, the appeal
asked the Tenth Circuit to determine whether either a court or the
plaintiffs could provide other similarly situated employees, potential
plaintiffs, with notice of the pending lawsuit. 98
In deciding this issue, the Tenth Circuit initially distinguished a sec-
tion 216(b) collective action from a class action brought pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.99 In a class action, all members of
the established class will be bound by the resulting judgment unless a
member of the established class specifically "opts-out" of the class.' 0 0
Given the effect of resjudicata, due process requires that all class mem-
bers be given notice and the opportunity to opt-out of the class so that
their substantive rights will not be adversely affected by a binding judg-
ment resulting from a lawsuit of which they had no knowledge.'
0 '
A section 216(b) collective action provides that a similarly situated
employee must take an affirmative step and "opt-in" to a pending FLSA
action in order to be bound by the resulting judgment. 10 2 Conse-
quently, a potential litigant who does not receive notice and is unaware
of a pending action will not have his substantive rights adversely affected
by the outcome of that action.'
0 3
It is the notice aspect, born of the "opt-out/opt-in" distinction be-
tween Rule 23 class actions and section 216(b) collective actions which
was the focus of Dolan.10 4 Although section 216(b) provides remedies
against spurious collective actions, it is mute with respect to the proce-
dural mechanism by which such actions are brought and the extent, if
any, to which a court or a litigant may become involved with providing
97. See supra note 93.
98. Dolan v. Project Construction Corp., 558 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Colo. 1983).
99. 725 F.2d at 1256. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims of de-
fenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) provides in pertinent part:
"The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from
the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable
or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any mem-
ber who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance
through his counsel."
Id.
101. Dolan, 725 F.2d at 1266.
102. Id.
103. See Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1977); LaChapelle v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding trial court rulings that po-
tential class members in a suit brought pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, were required to "opt into" the action).
104. Dolan, 725 F.2d at 1265.
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notification of a pending section 216(b) action to other employees who
would be eligible to join therein. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
attempted to articulate this procedure in the wake of conflicting deci-
sions by the Second, 10 5 Seventh, 10 6 and Ninth Circuits. 10 7 The Tenth
Circuit reached its decision by gleaning what guidance it could from the
legislative history. 108
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Dolan allows plaintiffs or counsel to
notify other potential plaintiffs of a pending FLSA action but prohibits
judicial involvement in either discovery or notification thereof.10 9 This
holding followed the court's discussion of the history of the FLSA, judi-
cial expansion of the FLSA, and subsequent congressional action to pull
in the reins on that judicial expansion." 10
The court bolstered its rationale, which drew heavily from the legis-
lative history, by contrasting certain section 216(b) aspects with diamet-
rically opposed provisions of a class action suit.'"I The Tenth Circuit
concluded that the class action "opt-out" provision encourages litiga-
tion and requires active judicial participation to protect substantive
rights. Conversely, the section 216(b) "opt-in" provision discourages
litigation and relegates the court to passive duties and limited
jurisdiction.
The court's holding was also motivated to accommodate Congress's
desire not to unduly burden the defendant. 1 2 In the district court ac-
tion, plaintiff propounded interrogatories which requested the names of
all similarly situated employees and numerous specifics regarding the
terms of each employee's employment. The Tenth Circuit noted that
allowing such discovery would be a substantial drain on the defendant's
time and money.
The Tenth Circuit specifically rejected the Seventh Circuit's inter-
pretation of the same legislative history 1 3 and, consequently, rejected
the Seventh Circuit's holding' 14 except that portion which prohibits no-
tice to potential plaintiffs from being sent out on district court letter-
head over the signature of the court clerk. This restrictive measure was
imposed to prevent a possible misunderstanding by potential plaintiffs
105. Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 660 F.2d 335 (2d Cir.
1979) (allowing court sponsored notice).
106. Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that
plaintiff could communicate with other members of the class under terms and conditions
prescribed by the court, but notice should not go out on court letterhead over the signa-
ture of a court official).
107. Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1977) (prohibiting notice
from plaintiff, counsel, and court).
108. Portal to Portal Act of 1947 § 5, Pub. L. No. 49, 61 Stat. 84. H.R. REP. No. 71,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947); reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1032.
109. Dolan, 725 F.2d at 1268.
110. Id. at 1266-67.
111. Id. at 1267.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1267 n.3.
114. Id. at 1268; see supra note 106.
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that the judicial imprimatur represented that the suit had merit,' 15
Dolan provides the procedural limitations upon the notice which can
be given to similarly situated potential plaintiffs in an FLSA action.' 16
Thus, the Tenth Circuit allows parties to notify similarly situated em-
ployees, but prohibits judicial involvement with both notification and
discovery in accordance with its interpretation that a FLSA section




A. Joinder of Immune Parties for Discovery of Proportional Fault
In Hefley v. Textron, Inc.,' 18 the Tenth Circuit considered the possi-
bility ofjoining immune governmental parties for the purpose of discov-
ery and assessment of proportionate fault. After consideration, the
court concluded that no such procedural mechanism exists.
1 1 9
The underlying action resulted from a helicopter crash which in-
jured three members of the Kansas Air National Guard (KANG). The
helicopter was manufactured by Textron, owned by the United States,
and operated by KANG.' 20 The three injured guardsmen brought suit
against Textron, whereupon Textron filed a third-party complaint
against the United States, Major General Fry (Fry), the State of Kansas,
and KANG. Textron sought indemnity, contribution, discovery, and as-
sessment of proportionate fault.'
2 1
The district court granted the third-party defendants' motion for
summary judgment, concluding that the United States and Fry were im-
mune from suit based on the Feres12 2 and Stencel123 doctrines. The dis-
trict court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Textron's claim
that it had an implied contract of indemnity with the United States. Pro-
visions of the eleventh amendment were the basis for ruling that Kansas
and KANG were immune from suit. 12 4 Ultimately, the district court
115. Id. at 1268. The court also reasoned: "To actively involve the trial court in the
sending of notice would necessarily involve engrafting certain additional class action pro-
cedures to protect the administration of the case from improper certification and issuance
of notice. We refuse to begin this involved process without clear congressional guidance."
Id.
116. Id.
117. It remains to be seen whether this rule announced by the Tenth Circuit will con-
serve resources, both judicial and the defendant's, or whether subsequent suits brought by
those employees who could have been initially joined as plaintiffs will ultimately burden
the resources sought to be conserved.
118. 713 F.2d 1487 (10th Cir. 1983).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1489.
121. Id.
122. Derived from Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
123. Derived from Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666
(1977).
124. "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XI.
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ruled that no procedural mechanism existed which would allow Textron
to join the immune entities solely for discovery purposes and assessment
of proportionate fault.1
25
Textron's appeal presented the following issues:
1) Can Major General Fry be held liable for his own negli-
gence in performing non-discretionary duties?
2) Can the third-party defendants be kept in the case to deter-
mine whether they are liable to Textron under a theory of an
implied contract of indemnity?
3) Can the third-part defendants be kept in the case, despite
immunity, for purposes of discovery and assessment of propor-
tionate fault under the Kansas comparative negligence
statute?1
26
Although Textron presented a battery of possible theories in support of
each issue, only those issues which the Tenth Circuit considered note-
worthy are addressed here.
B. Immunity of Government Officials
The Feres doctrine creates an exception to the United States' liability
for "injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the
course of activity incident to service,"' 12 7 for which no provisions were
made in the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). 12 8 This doctrine was
extended in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States. 129 In Stencel, the
Feres doctrine was held to absolve the United States from liability "when
a member of the Armed Services brings a tort action against a private
defendant and the latter seeks indemnity from the United States under
the Tort Claims Act, claiming the Government officials were primarily
responsible for the injuries."s Further, numerous cases have held that
the Feres doctrine is applicable to officers and other servicemen in addi-
tion to the United States.'
3 '
In Hefley, the Tenth Circuit carefully considered the ramifications of
the Feres and Stencil doctrines, and concluded that the Feres doctrine is a
separate judicial exception to the FTCA. i32 The Tenth Circuit found
Fry was immune from suit despite the fact that his actions may have been
ministerial 133 and notwithstanding the express discretionary function
exception to the FTCA. 134 The Court stressed that this decision was
125. Hefley, 713 F.2d at 1490.
126. Id.
127. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
128. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
129. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
130. Id. at 670.
131. See, e.g., Stanley v. Central Intelligence Agency, 639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981);
Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975); Mattos v. United States, 412 F.2d
793 (9th Cir. 1969); Bailey v. DeQuevedo, 375 F.2d 72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923
(1967).
132. Hefley, 713 F.2d at 1492.
133. Id.
134. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976), in pertinent part provides:
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not based upon blind adherence to the Feres or Stencel doctrines, nor to
sovereign immunity in general,' 3 5 but instead was an attempt to pro-
mote efficient administration of justice.1
36
C. Implied Contract of Indemnity
Despite Textron's contention that there was an implied contract for
indemnity, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's conclusion that it
lacked jurisdiction over this claim. This affirmation recognized that the
United States waived sovereign immunity for actions based on express
or implied contracts. 137 In cases involving actions on express or implied
contracts, however, the federal district courts are limited to claims not
exceeding $10,000; the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over
claims in excess of $10,000.138 Because Textron did not limit its claim
to $10,000 or less, the district court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction. 139
After affirming the district court on the issue of jurisdiction, the
Tenth Circuit proceeded to extend the Feres doctrine. The court stated:
As an alternative basis for affirming the decision of the trial
court, therefore, we hold that where the injured party is a ser-
viceman injured incident to military service, Feres and Stencel bar
a private party from recovering from the United States on a
claim of implied contract of indemnity.
140
As the basis for extending the Feres doctrine, the Tenth Circuit discussed
the liability of the United States as affected by the situs of the contract,
their attempt to avoid circumventing the limitations on liability con-
tained in federal military compensation schemes, and their goal of
avoiding a decision which would adversely affect military discipline.
14 1
D. Comparative Negligence and Discovery
After conceding that the third-party defendants were immune from
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title. .. shall not apply
to ... [a]ny claim ... based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion in--
volved be abused.
Id.
135. Hefley, 713 F.2d 1492.
136. Id.
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1978), in pertinent part,, provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent -with the Court of
Claims, of ... [alny other civil action or claim against the United States, not
exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution .... or
upon any express or implied contract with the United States .... For the pur-
pose of this paragraph, an express or implied contract with the Army and Air
Force Exchange Service, Navy Exchanges, Marine Corps Exchanges, Coast Guard
Exchanges, or Exchange Councils of the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-




139. Hefley, 713 F.2d at 1492.
140. Id. at 1493.
141. Id. at 1492-93.
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a suit seeking money damages, Textron argued that the third-party de-
fendants nevertheless could be joined for purposes of discovery and as-
sessment of comparative fault. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the federal courts from exercising
jurisdiction over the federal defendants. 14 2 Regarding the state defend-
ants, the Tenth Circuit relied upon the eleventh amendment to conclude
that Textron's claim was barred.143 Finally, with respect to both federal
and state defendants, the Tenth Circuit asserted that there is no proce-
dural mechanism by which to join any of the third-party defendants for
purposes of discovery or assessing proportionate fault.1
4 4
Hefley v. Textron is essentially a case which resolves many issues by
application of law to fact. It is notable for the extension of the Feres
doctrine and the court's assertion that no procedural device exists by
which defendants may be joined for the purpose of discovery and assess-
ment of comparative fault. In regard to the joinder issue, the Tenth
Circuit relied on the outcome determinative test outlined in Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York 14 5 and found:
to any extent that inclusion of the United States as a party
would allow more extensive discovery, which presumably
would provide evidence that would persuade the jury to assign
a lesser degree of fault to Textron, we conclude that the effect
on the outcome of the case would be trivial.
14 6
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit held that the Kansas Tort Claims Act
14 7
is procedural, not outcome determinative, and is therefore not binding
on the federal courts.
148
VI. TRIAL AND POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
A. Motion for Directed Verdict
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Peterson v. Hager149 illustrates the
harsh consequence which may result from application of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 50(a), Motion for a Directed Verdict. Upon denial of a
motion for directed verdict made at the close of an adversary's case, a
party has two options: first, a party may stand on his original motion
and have the denial reviewed on appeal; or second, he may proceed with
his case and introduce evidence. 150 By choosing the second option a
party waives the right to appeal the denied motion for directed
142. Id. at 1495.
143. Id. at 1499.
144. Id. at 1496, 1499.
145. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
146. Hefley, 713 F.2d at 1497.
147. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(c) (1976).
148. Hefley, 713 F.2d at 1497.
149. 724 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1984).
150. Id. at 854, citing with approval, 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MI..ER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2531 (1971); 5A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDE.RAI. PRACTICE 50.05[ I]
(2d ed. 1984).
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verdict. 151
In Peterson, the plaintiff brought suit for damages for injuries to his
pecan trees allegedly caused by defendant's negligent application of an
herbicide. 15 2 To recover damages for injury to crops, Oklahoma law
requires evidence of: (1) market value, (2) finishing costs, and (3) trans-
portation CoStS. 1 5 3 The plaintiff, however, only presented evidence of
market value, whereupon the defendant moved for a directed verdict on
grounds that the plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence as to
causation and the amount of damages. 154 After his motion was denied,
the defendant presented evidence showing plaintiff's reasonable costs
for finishing and transportation in an effort to reduce the amount of
damages. However, by so doing he provided the essential elements of
the plaintiff's case.'
55
At the close of all the evidence, the defendant renewed his motion
for directed verdict, which was again denied, and the defendant ap-
pealed. Notwithstanding the Tenth Circuit's conviction that the trial
court erred in denying the defendant's first motion for directed verdict,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed, reiterating what it termed the "well estab-
lished rule":
The renewed motion will be judged in the light of the case as it
stands at that time. Even though the court may have erred in
denying the initial motion, this error is cured if subsequent tes-
timony on behalf of the moving party repairs the defect of his
opponent's case. 
15 6
The Tenth Circuit in Peterson I, had originally reversed the district
court then, on rehearing, the district court's ruling was affirmed. 157 Pe-
terson l's sympathetic tack was apparently based upon a notion of just-
ness. The court recognized the dilemma in which defendant found
himself but did not cite the "well established rule" on which it relied on
rehearing. Instead, Peterson I recognized that the defendant's presenta-
tion of evidence remedied the plaintiffs case and viewed this as an ac-
tion by the defendant to reduce the amount for which he might
ultimately be liable. The court in Peterson I concluded that the trial court
should have directed a verdict for the defendant at the close of the plain-
tiffs evidence. 1
58
This case illustrates that trial courts, on occasion, commit grievous
151. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2531
(1971); 5A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 50.05[1] (2d ed. 1984).
152. Peterson, 724 F.2d at 853.
153. Garrett v. Haworth, 183 Okla. 569, 83 P.2d 822 (1938).
154. Peterson, 724 F.2d at 853.
155. Peterson v. Hager, 714 F.2d 1035 (10th Cir. 1983). On the initial hearing of this
case, this view was first expressed.
156. Peterson, 724 F.2d at 854 (emphasis deleted), (quoting 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2531 (1971)). Accord Newman v. Brengle, 250
F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 951 (1958); Auto Transport v. Potter, 197
F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1952).
157. Peterson v. Hager, 714 F.2d 1035 (10th Cir. 1983).
158. Id.
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errors and in the face of such errors, a party has difficult tactical deci-
sions to make. The outcome of this case demonstrates that Rule 50(a) is
not always construed so as to "secure the just . . . determination of
[the] action," as all rules must be construed.
15 9
B. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and New Trial
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), Motion for a Directed Ver-
dict and for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, in part, provides:
A motion for a new trial may be joined with this motion [for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict], or a new trial may be
prayed for in the alternative. If a verdict was returned the court
may allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment
and either order a new trial or direct the entry ofjudgment as if
the requested verdict had been directed.
Although this provision has been restrictively interpreted by a large
majority of courts, it has been interpreted flexibly by a well-reasoned
minority. 160 The majority and minority views are in agreement in rec-
ognizing that where a motion for judgment n.o.v. may properly be
granted by the trial court, the trial court need not necessarily grant it. 16 1
Rather, the trial court has the discretion to grant, in the alternative, a
new trial ifjustice dictates.16 2 The conflict of opinion arises in the situ-
ation where the court determines that the moving party is not entitled to
judgment n.o.v. The Tenth Circuit addressed this controversy in Kain v.
Winslow Manufacturing Inc. 163
In this case the United States District Court for the District of Kan-
sas sua sponte granted the defendant a new trial. Judgment was originally
entered in October of 1980, and the defendant filed a timely motion for
judgment n.o.v. but did not join therewith a request for a new trial. In
November of 1981, some thirteen months afterjudgment, the trial court
ordered the new trial.164
The plaintiff's notice appealing the district court's action was spe-
cifically addressed to the order of new trial. Upon consideration of this
matter, the Tenth Circuit reversed after discussing the controversy sur-
rounding the discretionary provision of rule 50(b). The court con-
cluded by reiterating the fact dhat the district court was powerless to
order a new trial and that the order exceeded its jurisdiction.' 6 5
When a cout deterinics tiat the moving party is not entitled to a
judgment ii.o.v.. and the movant has not joined a request for a new trial,
the majority view requires that the verdict stand and the court is without
jurisdiction to grnt a ne'w trial.' 6 6 According to the minority view, a
159. FED. R. Cir. P. 1.
160. See, e.g., Kain v. Winslow Nitg., Inc., 736 F.2d 606, 215 (10th Cir. 1984) (minority).
161. Cone v. West Virginia I"'lp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 215 (1947) (dictum).
162. Id.
163. 736 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Peterman v. Chicago. Rock Island & Pac. R.R., Co., 493 F.2d 88 (8th Cir.), cert.
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motion for judgment n.o.v. implicitly encompasses a motion for a new
trial. 16 7 Conversely, the majority finds support in the wording of Rule
50(b), the provisions of Rule 59, and policy considerations.
16 8
The majority position is that the portion of Rule 50(b) which states
that "[a] motion for a new trial may be joined . . . or a new trial may be
prayed for in the alternative" is essentially a limitation on the trial
court's discretion to grant a new trial. 169 If, as the minority contends, a
motion for judgment n.o.v. encompasses a motion for a new trial, then
the above quoted language of Rule 50(b) would be superfluous. 170 In
Jackson v. Wilson Trucking Corp. 171 the court noted that the purpose of
Rule 59, sections (b) and (d), which provides for new trials,172 would be
largely nullified by the minority interpretation.
173
The policy considerations behind Rule 59, expressed in Kanatser v.
Chrysler Corp.,174 and cited with approval in Kain,175 were found to be
equally appropriate considerations for limiting a court's jurisdiction
with regard to a Rule 50(b) grant of a new trial. 17 6 According to the
Kanatser court:
There is good reason for thus confining the trial court within
the narrow limits of its discretionary powers, for it is important
in the administration of justice that there shall be an end to
litigation, and that issues tried and decided by a jury shall not
be lightly set aside. If a case is to be retried, it should be done
with dispatch, lest the error of delay outweigh the error of
trial. '
77
As previously noted, the minority of jurisdictions allow the district
court to exercise its discretion and order a new trial in the situation
where the motion for judgment n.o.v. must be denied. Support for this
denied, 417 U.S. 947 (1974);Jackson v. Wilson Trucking Corp., 243 F.2d 212, 215 (D.C.
Cir. 1957). However, a trial court which acts "no later than 10 days after entry ofjudg-
ment. . . may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial
on motion of a party." FED. R. Civ. P. 59(d).
167. SeeJackson v. Wilson Trucking Corp., 243 F.2d 212, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (Burger,
J., dissenting); 5AJ. MOORE &J. LuCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 50.11 (2d ed. 1984).
168. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b), see supra text preceeding note 160; FED. R. Civ. P. 59:
(a) A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of
the issues (1) in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the
reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the
courts of the United States; and (2) in an action tied without ajury, for any of the
reasons for which rehearings have heretofore been granted in suits in equity in
the courts of the United States. On a motion for a new trial in an action tried
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment.
FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
169. Jackson, 243 F.2d at 216-17.
170. Id.
171. 243 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
172. These subsections provide a strict 10 day period in which a litigant or the court,
respectively, may motion or order a new trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(b), (d).
173. Jackson, 243 F.2d at 216.
174. 199 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 921 (1953).
175. 736 F.2d at 608.
176. Id.
177. Kanatser, 199 F.2d at 615.
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view is embodied in Judge (now ChiefJustice) Burger's dissenting opin-
ion in Jackson v. Wilson Trucking Corp. 178 Judge Burger characterized the
majority position as an artificial limitation upon a court's choice of reme-
dies which is contrary to the liberal spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 179 He reads the language of Rule 50(b), stating that a party
may join a motion for a new trial with a motion for judgment n.o.v., as a
"signpost" offering guidance rather than as a limitation.i80 More re-
cently, a noted commentator 8 offered the pragmatic view that where a
motion for judgment n.o.v. has been made, the adversary is on adequate
notice of the challenge to the sufficiency of evidence. Accordingly, it
would not be improper to deem a motion for new trial, on the ground
that the verdict was contrary to the great weight of evidence, to be in-
cluded within a motion for judgment n.o.v.
18 2
VII. FINAL JUDGMENT RULE
A. Subpoena Orders and the Perlman Exception
As prescribed by statute, United States circuit courts may only hear
appeals from final decisions of federal district courts. 183 An order to
appear before a grand jury pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum is an inter-
locutory order and consequently not appealable by the witness. 184 In
the case of In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Vargas,18 5 the Tenth Circuit ad-
dressed the application of an established exception to this rule to allow
appeal from a trial court's order directing a witness to produce
documents.
In Vargas, an attorney received a subpoena duces tecum directing him
to appear and deliver client billing records for a community health
center and another nonprofit corporation. I86 After complying with the
subpoena, the attorney received another subpoena directing him to pro-
178. Jackson, 243 F.2d at 217 (Burger, J., dissenting); See also 5A J. MOORE, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 50.11 (2nd ed. 1982); Note, Federal Court Procedure: Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 50(b): Authority of Trial Court to Grant New Trial on Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict, 5 UCLA L. REV. 154 (1958).
179. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Id.
180. Jackson, 243 F.2d at 222 (Burger, J., dissenting).
181. James W. Moore, author of MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE.
182. 5AJ. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 50.11 (2d ed. 1982).
183. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). This statute embodies the policy against piecemeal liti-
gation. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1945) (dictum) (the policy
against appeals other than from final decisions conserves judicial energy and prevents de-
lays caused by interlocutory appeals).
184. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1972) (subpoena duces tecum requir-
ing production before federal grand jury of records of respondent's overseas business not
appealable); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327-28 (1940) (just as important
to prevent delay of grand jury proceedings as of trial, thus no appeal proper from sub-
poena duces tecum); cf. Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 121-22 (1966) (subpoena
duces tecum requiring production of records before a special examiner not appealable). 28
U.S.C. § 1292 (1982) lists interlocutory orders from which appeals may be taken.
185. 723 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 90 (1984).
186. Id. at 1463.
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duce client files to substantiate the billings. 18 7 The attorney appeared
but refused to produce the records, claiming a fifth amendment privi-
lege regarding the records. 188 The presiding judge ordered the attor-
ney to produce the records and informed the attorney contempt
proceedings would result if he refused. 18 9 The community health
center filed an appeal and received a stay of the order.190 The attorney
later filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and, or in the alternative, a
Writ of Prohibition.191
In an opinion written by Judge McKay, the Tenth Circuit consid-
ered the health center's argument that although an order to appear at a
hearing pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum is ordinarily not appealable,
this case fell within the purview of the exception established in Perlman v.
United States. 192 The court noted that Perlman involved a situation where
a witness objected to release by the Clerk of the Court of constitution-
ally privileged documents to adverse parties. In Perlman, the Supreme
Court reasoned that the witness was unable to resist the order himself
and suffer contempt, and the clerk could hardly be expected to risk con-
tempt to protect the witness. Based on these facts, the Supreme Court
allowed the appeal, holding that if it ruled otherwise, Perlman would be
"powerless to avert the mischief of the order."' 93
Within circuit courts, one faction, led by the Second Circuit, 194 in-
terprets the Perlman exception narrowly, "emphasizing the policies be-
hind the final judgment rule and the nature of the relationship between
the party subpoenaed and the party possessing the privilege."195 Cases
from these circuits subscribe to the rationale that where an individual
objects to a subpoena duces tecum issued to a third party custodian of the
documents, the nature of the relationship between the third party and
witness should be considered. 196 Where the witness might be expected
to risk a contempt citation to protect the third party's privilege or inter-
187. Id. At issue in the investigation were charges of a scheme to use public money for
private gain.
188. Id. In a previously filed motion to quash the attorney asserted attorney-client and
work product privileges. Id.
189. Id. at 1464.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 247 U.S. 7 (1918).
193. Id. at 13.
194. See, e.g., National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 591 F.2d 174
(2d Cir. 1979) and cases cited therein.
195. Vargas, 723 F.2d at 1465.
196. See, e.g., In re Sealed case, 655 F.2d 1298, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (corporation may
not appeal denial of a motion to quash subpoena duces tecum requiring production by the
corporation's outside counsel of work product materials); In re Obe-Koetter, 612 F.2d 15,
18 (1st Cir. 1980) (client may not immediately appeal order directing attorney to testify
before grand jury); National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 591 F.2d
174, 177-79 (2d Cir. 1979) (government agency may not appeal, prior to contempt cita-
tion, order directing employees to answer questions of defendant in private class action).
See generally 9J. MOORE & J. LuCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRAC-riCE 110.13[2] (2d ed. 1984)
(discussing appealability prior to contempt citation, of orders requiring non-party disclo-
sure of information).
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est, appeal will not lie. 19 7
The other view interprets the Perlman exception broadly. Whenever
the subpoena is issued to the custodian of a third party's documents, the
third party may immediately appeal the denial of a motion to quash. An
immediate appeal is justified because the appellant himself cannot diso-
bey the order and appeal after being found in contempt.'
9 8
In Vargas, the Tenth Circuit adopted the narrow view. 199 The court
held that the third party is entitled to immediate appeal only when to
deny the appeal would eliminate any review whatsoever of his claim.
200
The court reasoned that an attorney might ordinarily be expected to
expose himself to contempt to protect the client's interest and demon-
strate his tenacity as an advocate. 20 ' Additionally, if the attorney asserts
a work-product privilege along with the attorney-client privilege, as in
Vargas, the attorney would be motivated to risk contempt to protect his
own interests. 20 2 The court concluded that the health center would have
to wait for a contempt citation to be issued against its attorney, or show
the attorney would produce the records when threatened with con-
tempt, in order to appeal.
20 3
As an alternate to appeal from a contempt citation, the court sug-
gested that application for a Writ of Mandamus could be used where
there has been a clear abuse of discretion by the trial judge.20 4 Consid-
ering the attorney's petition for Writ of Mandamus, or in the alternative,
Prohibition, the court found no abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial judge and denied the petition.
Although in Vargas the court has clearly articulated its stance on the
Perlman exception to the nonappealability of subpoena duces tecum or-
ders, the court's opinion is strangely quiet about its previous holdings in
this area. The court failed to mention its 1965 case of Covey Oil Co. v.
Continental Oil Co.,205 wherein it held that non-party witnesses served
with subpoenaes duces tecum "should not be required to expose them-
selves to the hazard of punishment in order to obtain a determination of
197. See supra note 196.
198. See, e.g., In re Berkley & Co. Inc., 629 F.2d 548, 551-52 (8th Cir. 1980) (corpora-
tion permitted to appeal district court's order to government which had custody of corpo-
ration's documents, to disclose documents); In re Matter of Grand Jury Applicants, C.
Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 619 F.2d 1022, 1024-26 (3d Cir. 1980) (corporation permitted to
appeal denial of motion to quash subpoenas directed to its employees); In re Grand Jury
Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 673-74 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915
(1979) (corporation permitted to appeal denial of motion to return records held by gov-
ernment, as to which records the corporation's employee had been ordered to testify);
Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Parsons, 561 F.2d 671, 673-74 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 942 (1978) (corporation permitted to appeal denial of a motion to quash subpoenas
requiring attorney from corporation's outside counsel to testify and produce documents
relating to representation of the corporation).
199. See supra note 196.
200. Vargas, 723 F.2d at 1465.
201. Id. at 1465-66.
202. Id. at 1466.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1467.
205. 340 F.2d 993 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 964 (1965).
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their claimed rights."'20 6 The court in Covey made this statement in re-
sponse to Continental's argument that the subpoenaed witnesses should
obtain review by disobeying the order and then appeal from a resultant
adjudication of contempt, instead of direct appeal.
20 7
Although the Tenth Circuit might have distinguished Covey on the
basis that Vargas involved a party witness, 20 8 several courts have applied
the non-appealability rules to non-party, as well as party witnesses. 20 9
Additionally, in the Tenth Circuit case of Sanders v. Great Western Sugar
Co.,210 non-party local officials of the Small Business Administration
were allowed to appeal an order requiring them to respond to a sub-
poena duces tecum on the authority of Covey.2 1' The officials in that case
claimed a governmental privilege of nondisclosure. 2 12 Sanders is re-
markably similar to Branch v. Phillips Petroleum,2 13 a case quoted in Vargas
and expressly disapproved.
2 14
In Vargas, the court should have delineated the scope of Covey
before adopting what appears to be a totally contrary view. If the court
perceived Covey to be distinguishable, it should have said so; if not, the
case should have been overruled. The Vargas court's failure to address
these previous inconsistent decisions 2 15 has considerably muddied the
clear policy and rule of law laid down in Vargas.
B. Orders Involving Injunctions
One statutory exception to the Final Judgment Rule 2 16 allows ap-
peals of right from district court orders "granting, continuing, modify-
ing, refusing, or dissolving injunctions. ' 2 17 The issue of whether
206. Id. at 996-97.
207. Id. at 996.
208. See American Express Warehousing Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 277,
282 (2d Cir. 1967) (dictum) (Covey distinguished where allowing appeal was justifiable be-
cause the appellant was not a party, and therefore, could not obtain review on appeal from
a judgment in the main action).
209. See Gialde v. Time, Inc., 480 F.2d 1295, 1298-1301 (8th Cir. 1973) (no appeal
permitted of discovery order directing non-party employee of defendant to disclose source
of his information); United States v. Anderson, 464 F.2d 1390, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (no
appeal permitted of discovery order directing non-party witnesses to answer deposition
questions); United States v. Fried, 386 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1967) (no appeal permitted
of denial of a motion to quash information subpoena served on non-party witness who was
defendant's son). See also National Super Spuds v. New York Mercantile Exch., 591 F.2d
174, 176-81 (2d Cir. 1979) (no appeal permitted of order directing non-party government
employee to respond to deposition questions).
210. 396 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1968).
211. Id. at 794.
212. Id. at 794-95.
213. 638 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1981).
214. Vargas, 723 F.2d at 1465.
215. Compare Centurion Inds., Inc. v. Warren Steurer & Assoc., 665 F.2d 323, 324 n.l
(10th Cir. 1981) (appeal permitted from order requiring non-party witness to disclose
trade secrets) with United States v. Feeney, 641 F.2d 821, 823-25 (10th Cir. 1981) (no
appeal permitted from denial of party intervenor's motion to quash subpoena duces lecum
requiring production of documents in connection with post-conviction proceedings).
216. "The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final deci-
sions of the district courts of the United States . 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
217. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1982).
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dismissal of a party seeking injunctive relief qualifies that party to appeal
under the statutory exception arose in B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Grand River
Dam Authority.
2 18
In Goodrich, B. F. Goodrich Company sued Grand River Dam Au-
thority (Grand River) in United States District Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma alleging 4 causes of action, the most significant of
which sought reformation of a settlement agreement between Grand
River and Goodrich. 2 19 Grand River, in turn, filed a third-party com-
plaint against Northeast Oklahoma Cooperative (Northeast) requesting
declaratory judgment. Northeast responded with a counterclaim seek-
ing injunctive relief.220 The District Court dismissed Northeast, the
third party defendant, on its own motion after determining no justicia-
ble controversy existed between Northeast and defendant Grand
River. 22 1 Northeast subsequently appealed the dismissal.
In considering whether Northeast might properly maintain its ap-
peal, the Court of Appeals quickly dismissed the contention that the dis-
trict court's order was a final judgment. The court noted that resolution
of at least three claims in the main suit between Goodrich and Grand
River still remained. 22 2 The court then summarily rejected Northeast's
final argument that since its counterclaim prayed for injunctive relief,
the order dismissing the counterclaim was tantamount to denial of an
injunction and therefore appealable.2 23 The court stated it could not
subscribe to such a strained interpretation of the statute-the district
court had not denied the injunction on the merits, but had simply dis-
missed Northeast from the entire proceeding. 2 24 The court dismissed
the appeal.
2 25
In judge Holloway's dissent, he argued that dismissal of Northeast's
counterclaim had the "effect" of refusing an injunction and Northeast
was therefore entitled to appeal. 2 26 Based on Carson v. American Brands,
Inc.,227 the dissent would allow an appeal where, as here, the party
showed both that the order had the practical effect of denying an injunc-
tion and that the order had serious or irreparable consequences which
could only be effectively challenged through immediate appeal.
22 8
In Carson, the parties negotiated a settlement permanently en-
joining defendant employers from discriminating against black employ-
ees.2 29 The district court refused to enter a consent decree to this
218. 712 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1983).




223. Id. at 455. Northeast claimed the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear the
appeal based on 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1982). (see supra note 217 and accompanying
text).
224. Id. at 455.
225. Id.
226. Id. (Holloway, J., dissenting).
227. 450 U.S. 79 (1981).
228. Goodrich, 712 F.2d at 455.
229. Carson, 450 U.S. at 81 (respondent employers and unions agreed to give hiring
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effect. 2 30 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the
appeal saying the court's refusal did not amount to denial of injunc-
tion 2 3 ' under section 1292.232 The Supreme Court reversed, stating
that although the district court's refusal to enter the consent decree did
not technically deny an injunction, it nevertheless had the "practical ef-
fect of doing so." 2 3 3 The Court held that in order for appeal to lie, the
party must show not only that the order had the practical effect of refus-
ing an injunction, but that "an interlocutory order of the court might
have a 'serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,' and that the order
can be 'effectually challenged' only by immediate appeal .... 234
Judge Holloway would have held that Northeast met this burden.
23 5
Although there is some support for the Tenth Circuit's holding in Good-
rich,23 6 perhaps the court should have considered Northeast's argument
more closely.
VIII. CROSS-APPEALS
Savage v. Cache Valley Dairy Assoc.23 7 takes up the issue of whether
filing a cross-appeal within the fourteen-day period, provided by Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(3),238 is a jurisdictional prerequisite
for the appellate court. In Savage, the plaintiff-appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal. The two defendant-cross-appellants filed their cross-
appeals one day and five days late, respectively.
The Tenth Circuit's consideration of this issue notes that several of
the circuits are in disagreement as to whether timely filing of a cross-
appeal is or is not jurisdictional. Both the Seventh Circuit 23 9 and the
Sixth Circuit 2 40 hold that the timely filing of a cross-appeal is a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite. Conversely, the Ninth Circuit 24 1 and Third Cir-
cuit 2 4 2 hold that the cross-appeal rule is not a jurisdictional mandate.
and seniority preferences to black employees and to fill one-third of certain supervisory
positions with qualified blacks).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 82.
232. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1982).
233. Carson, 450 U.S. at 83-84.
234. Id. at 84 (quoting Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181
(1955)).
235. Goodrich, 712 F.2d at 456.
236. See, e.g., Shirey v. Bensalem Township. 663 F.2d 472, 475-78 (3d Cir. 1981) (dis-
missal of plaintiffs' prayer for injunctive relief not appealable because plaintiffs neither
sought a preliminary injunction, nor alleged continuing harm, and because the district
court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for reasons unrelated to plaintiffs' entitlement to in-
junctive relief).
237. 737 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1984).
238. In pertinent part, the rule provides: "If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party,
any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first
notice of appeal was filed .... " FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(3).
239. Martin v. Hamil, 608 F.2d 725, 731 (7th Cir. 1979).
240. Richland Knox Mutual Ins. Co. v. Kallen, 376 F.2d 360, 364 (6th Cir. 1967).
241. Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1981).
242. Scott v. University of Delaware, 601 F.2d 76, 83 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931
(1979).
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Previously, in two unpublished opinions, 243 the Tenth Circuit has
held that the filing of a timely cross-appeal is both mandatory and juris-
dictional. In Savage, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the unpublished deci-
sions are binding precedent. Accordingly, in the Tenth Circuit,
compliance with the provision of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure





243. Herndon v. Piper Aircraft Corp., No. 81-1916 (10th Cir. October 5, 1981);Jenkins
v. Peet, No. 82-1705 (10th Cir. July 29, 1982).
244. Savage, 737 F.2d at 889.
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